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Abstract 11 
Cooperation and competition are two key components of social life.  Current research 12 
agendas investigating the psychological underpinnings of competition and cooperation in non-13 
human primates are misaligned. The majority of work on competition has been done in the 14 
context of theory of mind and deception, while work on cooperation has mostly focused on 15 
collaboration and helping. The current impression that theory of mind is not necessarily 16 
implicated in cooperative activities and that helping could not be an integral part of competition 17 
might therefore be rather misleading. Furthermore, theory of mind research has mainly focused 18 
on cognitive aspects like the type of stimuli controlling responses, the nature of representation 19 
and how those representations are acquired, while collaboration and helping have focused 20 
primarily on motivational aspects like prosociality, common goals, and a sense of justice and 21 
other-regarding concerns. We present the current state of these two bodies of research paying 22 
special attention to how they have developed and diverged over the years. We propose potential 23 
directions to realign the research agendas to investigate the psychological underpinnings of 24 
cooperation and competition in primates and other animals. 25 
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Introduction 28 
Cooperation and competition are two key components of social life. Coalitions and 29 
alliances represent the quintessential example illustrating how individuals simultaneously 30 
compete against some group members and cooperate with others [1-3]. Since many social species 31 
such as primates, hyenas, coatis, dolphins and corvids typically interact with multiple partners 32 
over extended periods of time, keeping track of friends and foes (for both oneself and other group 33 
members) can become a quite challenging enterprise. In fact, it is precisely this fluid state of 34 
affairs that constitutes one of the main reasons why social life is thought to be particularly 35 
complex, and why some authors placed a particular emphasis on social as opposed to non-social 36 
aspects to explain the evolution of cognition (e.g. [4, 5]).   37 
Further elaboration of this idea led Whiten and Byrne [6] to focus on the tactics deployed 38 
by primates to cooperate and compete with others, the so-called Machiavellian Intelligence 39 
hypothesis, whereas Dunbar’s [7, 8] Social Brain hypothesis focused on keeping track of social 40 
relations. Those hypotheses, with cooperation and competition at their core, were instrumental in 41 
setting up the stage to investigate in greater detail the psychological processes underlying 42 
cooperation and competition in primates and other animals. However, the way researchers have 43 
investigated the psychology of cooperation and competition is quite different, so different that 44 
one can speak about misaligned research agendas. Whereas work on competition has mainly been 45 
studied in the context of theory of mind and deception, work on cooperation has focused on 46 
collaboration and helping. Such dissociation can be misleading because it may give the 47 
impression that theory of mind is not implicated in cooperative activities and conversely, that 48 
helping could not be an integral part of competition. 49 
More importantly, the psychological aspects investigated with regard to competition and 50 
cooperation differ substantially. Whereas theory of mind has focused on cognitive aspects, things 51 
like the type of stimuli controlling responses [9], the nature of representation [10] and how those 52 
representations are acquired [11], collaboration and helping have focused primarily on 53 
motivational aspects. More precisely, those studies have focused on whether individuals behave 54 
prosocially towards others [12], can work together for common goals [13], and have a sense of 55 
justice [14, 15] and concern for the needs of others [16]. In this chapter we will present these two 56 
bodies of research emphasizing how they have developed and diverged over the years. Although 57 
our review will concentrate on primates (mainly chimpanzees since the most elaborated work has 58 
been done on them), we will include work on non-primates whenever possible. In the last part of 59 
this chapter we will propose how to realign the research agendas aimed at investigating the 60 
psychological underpinnings of cooperation and competition. 61 
Mindreading 62 
The onset of research on theory of mind is easy to pinpoint: Premack and Woodruff’s [17] 63 
seminal paper and the commentaries that accompanied it. Premack and Woodruff reported a set 64 
of provocative findings about a chimpanzee seemingly attributing intentions to a human solving 65 
physical problems. Several commentators challenged these findings both on theoretical and 66 
empirical grounds thus launching a debate that continues to this day fuelled by new empirical 67 
findings and additional alternative interpretations (see [18]). Whereas some argue that there is no 68 
evidence of theory of mind, others think that there is evidence of some aspects of theory of mind 69 
[19-21]. These disagreements, however, should not obscure the fact that real progress has taken 70 
place in this area over the years. Although not all questions have been answered to everyone’s 71 
satisfaction, it is uncontroversial that some of the interpretations that were tenable a few years 72 
ago are no longer viable as explanations for some of the existing data. Let us review some of this 73 
evidence. 74 
Throughout the 1980's and 90's, most non-human primate studies on theory of mind 75 
abilities were based on equivalent studies with human children with methodologies in 76 
cooperative contexts (e.g. [22-25]). The cooperative/communicative paradigm with humans 77 
invariably required long training regimes and produced not much convincing evidence for 78 
mindreading skills in non-human primates (see [26, 27] for reviews). Hare et al.’s [28] study 79 
marked a turning point in how mindreading experiments were conducted with primates and other 80 
species including dogs, goats and ravens [29]. These authors abandoned the information donation 81 
paradigm based on gesture comprehension that had dominated the previous decade and placed 82 
pairs of chimpanzees in a competitive situation.  Subordinate chimpanzees could outsmart 83 
dominant individuals in a food competition game only if they could assess what dominant 84 
individuals could and could not see. The results differed considerably from those from previous 85 
studies. Subordinates preferred to take those food pieces that dominants could not see, and they 86 
did so spontaneously without any training. Results of this and subsequent studies suggested that 87 
chimpanzees and some other species know what others can and cannot see and hear, and also 88 
who has seen what in the past (see [30-33]).  Crockford et al. [31] study is particularly important 89 
for two reasons.  First, it confirmed that chimpanzees keep track of ‘who has seen what’ in a field 90 
experiment.  The authors found that chimpanzees were more likely to produce a snake alarm call 91 
upon encountering a snake when their potential audience were unaware of the snake’s presence. 92 
Second, unlike most other studies reporting positive evidence of mindreading in animals, this 93 
study used a cooperative (i.e., donating information) rather than a competitive situation. 94 
Nevertheless, these findings were open to alternative interpretations. Povinelli and 95 
colleagues (e.g. [9, 19, 34, 35]) argued that chimpanzees did not really attribute mental states to 96 
others, they read their behaviour and had learned (or were predisposed) to behave in appropriate 97 
ways. However, some of their proposed explanations were ruled out quite quickly with additional 98 
data. For instance, Hare et al. [36] showed that chimpanzees responded to the face orientation of 99 
competitors, not just body orientation. Also Hare et al. [37] demonstrated that Hare et al.'s [28] 100 
original findings were not simply a result of chimpanzees preferring to take pieces in the vicinity 101 
of barriers. Other explanations, however, were not so easily ruled out by those data. 102 
Most notably among them was the so-called evil eye hypothesis, i.e., individuals avoid 103 
food pieces that have been seen by others. Or put in behavioural reading terms, the observable 104 
cue that chimpanzees might have used was based on a geometric appreciation of the line of sight 105 
between the competitor and the food. Note that geometric gaze following has been described in 106 
primates and corvids [38-40]. Applied to the competitive case, it meant that if the competitor’s 107 
line of sight to the food’s current location was not blocked by any visual barrier, then the 108 
individual should refrain from approaching/selecting that food. Leaving aside the fact that such a 109 
computation already involves a certain kind of perspective-taking (see [10]), a kind of direct 110 
perceptual perspective-taking at the very least, and that in some experiments it requires the 111 
subject to keep a memory of the event tied to a particular individual (e.g. [37]), it is true that this 112 
explanation alone could account for many of the existing findings. However, in the last few years 113 
several studies have appeared that make this explanation untenable. We turn to this evidence 114 
next. 115 
Schmelz et al. [41] directly addressed the evil eye hypothesis by preventing the subject 116 
from seeing the competitor seeing the food and thus completely eliminating any possible cues for 117 
the subjects during the study. Schmelz and colleagues [41, 42] adopted Kaminski et al.'s [43] 118 
paradigm in which pairs of chimpanzees competed by taking turns in selecting containers where 119 
food was hidden, but improved it in two important ways. First, they added non-social controls 120 
that were procedurally identical to the experimental conditions with the only difference that no 121 
competitor was present in the opposite cage. Second, although the subject knew whenever a 122 
competitor was present, they did not see each other at all during testing. Subjects therefore had no 123 
chance of reading behavioural cues from the competitor and had to infer the competitor's choice. 124 
In one study [41], there was a hole on one side of the sliding platform that only the subject 125 
knew about. While the competitor's view to the platform and the subject was blocked, the subject 126 
observed the baiting of one food item placed inside that hole, covered by a plastic board resting 127 
flat on the platform, and another identical food item on the other side of the platform with an 128 
identical plastic board leaning against it and therefore acquiring a slant. Afterwards, her view of 129 
the platform was blocked too. If the subject could then choose first (and also in the non-social 130 
controls), she had no reason to prefer one side as there was identical food on both. However, if 131 
she could only choose after the competitor, she had to think about which side the competitor had 132 
already chosen. The subject had to consider that from the competitor's point of view there were 133 
two plastic boards (one flat, one slanted) and that the competitor was unaware about the hole in 134 
the platform. The competitor could therefore only infer the presence of food under the slanted 135 
board. If the subject understood this, she should avoid that side when she chose after the 136 
competitor, which is what she did compared to all other conditions, thus suggesting that 137 
chimpanzees knew that others make inferences. Behavioural reading and associative learning 138 
cannot easily explain this finding. 139 
One thing was problematic though. Subjects selected the slanted board 50% of the time in 140 
the social condition when they selected after the competitor, which may indicate indifference 141 
between the two options. In a second study [42] when the competitor chose one food location, the 142 
piece of food was not actually removed but remained there. Therefore, whatever the subject 143 
chose, she was non-differentially rewarded in every condition, completely ruling out any 144 
possibility for associative learning. In this study, the two food locations were boxes with pictures: 145 
one picture of ten food pellets, the other one empty. All subjects had shown a strong preference 146 
for the food picture in a pre-test when they did not know what was actually inside the box. In the 147 
test, subjects observed the baiting while the competitor's view was blocked and saw that there 148 
was identical food in both boxes. Again there were three control conditions, one in which the 149 
subject could choose before the competitor and the two corresponding non-social conditions with 150 
no competitor present. Subjects chose the box with the food picture less than expected by chance 151 
only in the condition in which the competitor had chosen before them, thus avoiding the same 152 
box they had preferred in the pre-test. This suggests that they inferred that the competitor (that 153 
had not seen the baiting) would share their own preference for the box with the food picture and 154 
avoided it afterwards under the assumption that it was already chosen. Learning and behavioural 155 
reading were ruled out to be potential explanations in this paradigm. 156 
This second study established two things. First, it confirmed the pattern of results from the 157 
previous study using different stimuli. Second, it showed that preference rather than an inference 158 
could explain the results. Subjects seemed to attribute to others their own preferences and chose 159 
the opposite when they chose second. Nevertheless, such a result is interesting because it informs 160 
us that individuals may make inferences about others based on their own preferences. Could this 161 
also be extrapolated to others’ perceptions and knowledge? Are the inferences that subjects make 162 
about others’ mental states also grounded on their own mental states? How individuals come to 163 
attribute perception and knowledge has been a topic of much discussion in the literature and some 164 
have argued that only by showing an extrapolation from self-experience to others one can be sure 165 
that individuals are attributing mental states rather than using observable cues or behavioural 166 
rules. If I have experienced a seemingly opaque barrier to be in reality transparent, will I also 167 
attribute this mistaken perception to others? This idea is precisely the basis of the so-called 168 
“goggles experiment” [19, 44, 45]. A subject is initially exposed to two pairs of dark goggles that 169 
only differ in rim colour. Once she wears them though, she also discovers another interesting 170 
feature. Whereas one can see through one of the goggles, the others are completely opaque and 171 
one cannot see through them. Would this individual who has experienced the properties of these 172 
goggles attribute seeing or not seeing to another individual who is wearing one or the other? This 173 
elegant test, however, has been notoriously difficult to implement for practical reasons. 174 
Chimpanzees do not typically wear goggles and using begging to request from one or another 175 
experimenter has not proven a very fruitful method. 176 
Karg et al. [46] have recently implemented a version of the googles experiment by 177 
capitalizing on the competitive task developed by Hare et al. [36] a few years earlier and a recent 178 
study on human infants that used blindfolds to test this same question [47]. Here, there were two 179 
boxes on either side of the experimenter who was facing the subject in front of her cage. Before 180 
the test, the experimenter established a competitive situation such that she put food inside these 181 
boxes and whenever the subject tried to reach inside one to grab the food and the experimenter 182 
could see it, she withdrew and removed it. In the test proper, two lids of these boxes were 183 
introduced; one was a see-through flyscreen while the other one was opaque. While both were in 184 
an upright position, the subject could experience the properties of the lids when the experimenter 185 
moved food behind them. Then the lids were closed over the two boxes in such a way that from 186 
the point of view of the subject, both lids now looked identically opaque. However, from the 187 
point of view of the experimenter the screen was transparent while the other lid was opaque. Both 188 
boxes were baited with identical food and the chimpanzee subject could then reach inside one of 189 
them to obtain the food reward. In order to be successful, the subject had to understand the 190 
perspective of the experimenter and avoid the side of the transparent screen, even though both 191 
lids looked identical from the subject's current point of view. In a control condition, there was a 192 
transparent lid instead of the screen that remained transparent from the point of view of the 193 
subject at all times. In another non-social control, the chimpanzee could again choose between 194 
the screen and the opaque side but the human competitor had left the apparatus before so that 195 
there was no reason to avoid the side of the screen. Results showed that the chimpanzee subjects 196 
made no difference between the screen condition and the fully transparent condition and chose 197 
the opaque side more than expected by chance in these conditions but chose randomly in the non-198 
social control condition. This suggests that chimpanzees understood the perspective of the human 199 
competitor and passed the well-known "goggles experiment". Again this skill was shown in a 200 
competitive context. 201 
Despite all this progress in methodology and evidence for several aspects of mindreading 202 
in chimpanzees, positive evidence for the one task generally considered to be the benchmark of a 203 
full‐fledged theory of mind – the false belief test – is absent. The well-established paradigms of 204 
Hare et al. [37] and Kaminski et al. [43] found little, if any, evidence to suggest that chimpanzees 205 
were able to know when a conspecific had a false belief. Krachun et al. [48] also yielded negative 206 
results in another competitive paradigm. Given the positive results of these exact methodologies 207 
with regards to other skills, these negative findings are especially striking. However, it remains 208 
possible that chimpanzees and other species (e.g. rhesus macaques) simply have not been 209 
confronted with the appropriate context in which they might pass a false belief test yet. It is also 210 
possible that this specific skill is unique to humans. 211 
In sum, chimpanzees avoid target objects even without seeing the partner seeing them and 212 
they can decide whether a human competitor will see them reaching through one of two 213 
apparently opaque barriers based on their own previous personal experience with those barriers. 214 
These findings rule out explanations based on the evil eye hypothesis and geometric estimation, 215 
unless one wants to postulate that even though chimpanzees do not directly perceive geometry, 216 
they can imagine it based on the likely position of the objects and the competitor at a given point 217 
in time. At the very least, one has to postulate that chimpanzees are capable of imagining 218 
geometric projections between currently unobservable agents and objects. Furthermore, there is 219 
evidence showing that they do use personal information to attribute perceptions to others. 220 
Although most of the work has focused on chimpanzees, it is possible that other species may 221 
show comparable abilities.  For instance, scrub jays have been reported to respond to currently 222 
unobservable cues and to use experience projection when competing with conspecifics [49]. Does 223 
this close the debate on theory of mind in nonhuman animals? Obviously not, it simply shows 224 
that some of the crude explanations purely based on the perception and association of certain cues 225 
do not support the weight of the existing evidence, which does require explanations based on 226 
more abstract constructs. 227 
Collaboration and helping 228 
Similar to the history of mindreading studies, the experimental study of cooperation in 229 
primates also had a rough start. Crawford’s [50] study on chimpanzee collaboration, defined as 230 
two or more individuals working together to obtain a goal, marks its beginning. Pairs of 231 
chimpanzees simultaneously pulled ropes attached to a box containing out-of-reach food. Such a 232 
setup represented a natural extension of the classical string pulling problems that became so 233 
popular during the last century (see [51] for a review) except that two rather than a single 234 
individual were required to bring the reward within reach. Unlike the individual string pulling 235 
task, which is solved spontaneously by many species [51], the collaborative version of this 236 
problem proved to be quite a challenge for chimpanzees. Crawford [50] had to scaffold 237 
chimpanzees in various ways including to get them to work together. 238 
Although by the end of the 1990's numerous field studies had documented cooperation in 239 
the form of coalitions, group hunting and territorial defence in multiple  species (e.g. [52, 53]), 240 
there was still very limited experimental evidence about the psychological underpinnings of 241 
cooperative problem solving in animals without human intervention or training (for a review see 242 
[27]). In studies by Chalmeau and Gallo [54, 55], chimpanzees learned to obtain food through 243 
collaborative activity and take the presence of another individual into account but the 244 
understanding of each other's roles and their common goal could not be shown conclusively. 245 
Furthermore, only a handful of individuals cooperated and social coercion rather than 246 
collaboration seemed responsible for the success of some individuals.  But similar to mindreading 247 
research, things changed and the last decade has witnessed a flurry of research activity that has 248 
reinvigorated this field of research. 249 
A new apparatus design by Hirata and Fuwa [56] constituted a major breakthrough in 250 
collaboration studies. Although the apparatus was still based on Crawford’s original design, it 251 
completely eliminated the possibility of solving it individually (by pulling harder than the 252 
experimenter had anticipated) by replacing weights for a clever system of a sliding rope. Unless 253 
both ends of the rope are pulled together, the food remains in place. Using Hirata and Fuwa’s 254 
apparatus, Melis et al. [13] tested chimpanzees and found that whenever the subjects could not 255 
achieve pulling both ends simultaneously by themselves, they opened a door for another 256 
individual to enter so that the problem could be solved cooperatively. Moreover, when given the 257 
choice between two potential partners, subjects preferably chose the one they knew to be more 258 
effective in cooperatively obtaining the food. Interestingly, Hirata and Fuwa's [56] chimpanzees 259 
also cooperated but they were not as effective as those tested by Melis and colleagues [13]. Here, 260 
chimpanzees only learned to cooperate through trial and error over time and never solicited 261 
collaboration from a conspecific partner. Furthermore, they had trouble waiting for a partner and 262 
their cooperation was best when paired with a human not another chimpanzee.  Recently, Suchak 263 
et al. [57] observed pairs and trios of chimpanzees pulling together a food tray. These 264 
chimpanzees were tested in a group setting (without pre-training) and could therefore freely 265 
choose their partners. Success rates and efficiency increased over time while futile attempts to 266 
solve the problem individually decreased. 267 
Interestingly, much of the research attention focused on the determinants of cooperation 268 
rather than on its cognitive underpinnings. Thus, Melis et al. [58] rediscovered that tolerance was 269 
a major determinant of cooperation (see [59]), especially when working together to access food.  270 
This became quite evident when Hare et al. [60] compared chimpanzees and bonobos using 271 
Hirata and Fuwa’s apparatus. When food was distributed into two piles and each partner could 272 
get a share of the food after pulling from their respective ropes, both species cooperated well. 273 
However, when food was clumped into a single pile, which meant that one individual could 274 
potentially monopolize it, bonobos continued to cooperate (and simply co-fed next to each other) 275 
whereas chimpanzee cooperation broke down as dominant individuals monopolized all the food 276 
available and subordinates stopped cooperating. 277 
One thing that quickly became apparent is that even though chimpanzees could cooperate 278 
with others in a competent manner, their motivation to do so seemed quite different from that 279 
observed in humans. More specifically, studies with human children have shown that they prefer 280 
to play together with another individual even if succeeding in the game does not require 281 
collaboration with a second person – the joint activity seems to be rewarding to humans in its 282 
own right [61]. Bullinger and colleagues [62] directly tested chimpanzees motivation to cooperate 283 
with conspecifics by giving them a choice between entering one of two different rooms: one with 284 
a "solo option", i.e. where they could pull in food with a rope by themselves; the other with a 285 
"collaboration option", i.e. where they could engage in the same collaborative pulling action 286 
described earlier and acquire an identical amount of food for themselves as in the solo option. 287 
Chimpanzees preferred to work alone but this preference was completely reversed when the 288 
collaboration option produced an extra piece of food than the solo option. In contrast, children 289 
presented with the same dilemma preferred the social option even if it paid the same as the 290 
individual option. 291 
Although no instance of food stealing was observed between chimpanzee pairs, perhaps 292 
chimpanzees avoided the social option because there was a possibility, albeit remote, that the 293 
food may be taken by the other individual. Another possibility is that children, unlike 294 
chimpanzees, prefer to do things together. It has been argued that humans [63] and cooperative 295 
breeding primates in general [64] are more prosocial towards conspecifics in terms of sharing 296 
goods and information whereas species like chimpanzees are more egocentric. Note that 297 
cooperation may work among chimpanzees because it is mutualistic and all individuals get 298 
rewarded simultaneously. When the reward is delayed for one of the partners and one has to take 299 
turns, cooperation often breaks down in chimpanzees, even for pairs that have been cooperating 300 
in previous sessions (e.g. [65]). 301 
However, there are some cases where after two subjects complete a task and only one gets 302 
rewarded, the subject that just received the reward continues working until her partner obtains the 303 
reward too [66] or where reciprocal exchanges between individuals ensue [67]. More compelling 304 
still are those cases involving helping defined as actively facilitating access (or the means to 305 
access) some good without obtaining any tangible benefit. Chimpanzees comply with requests, 306 
including requests from humans, by handing objects, sharing food and even releasing latches so 307 
that others can access rooms with food [68-70]. Control conditions in some of these studies 308 
indicate that subjects are aware of the consequences of their actions. 309 
These studies on helping have been interpreted as an indication that subjects are 310 
concerned about the welfare of others. In other words, the prosocial acts observed in numerous 311 
studies are grounded on empathic concern and demonstrate that individuals possess other-312 
regarding preferences [69, 71]. However, this interpretation has been challenged on 313 
methodological and conceptual grounds. First, Tennie et al. [72] have argued that some of the 314 
prosocial acts may have originated from a combination of novelty about the experimental 315 
situation (including the stimuli used) and stimulus enhancement. In other words, the design of the 316 
tasks that only involved a choice for the subjects between helping and doing nothing may have 317 
been responsible for the results. More specifically, Tennie and colleagues [72] basically 318 
replicated earlier study designs in which chimpanzee subjects could choose to help conspecifics 319 
to access food without the prospect of receiving it themselves over doing nothing, but they also 320 
introduced a new condition in which chimpanzee subjects could actively block the access to food 321 
for conspecifics or do nothing. Results showed no difference between the two conditions, 322 
chimpanzees were just as likely to help as they were to block the access to food. Any benefit or 323 
harm to conspecific recipients caused by the subjects' behaviour apparently only arose out of 324 
initial interest in the apparatus and the only possible action they could perform. In both the 325 
beneficial and the harmful condition, this behaviour was extinguished after several trials so that 326 
neither a prosocial or spiteful motivation could be detected.  327 
Second, in the vast majority of studies requests must be made for the prosocial act to 328 
occur. Often when such requests receive no response, requests are repeated and amplified, 329 
something that is not surprising given that such is one of the features of intentional gestural 330 
communication [73]. It is therefore conceivable that prosocial acts are aimed at eliminating the 331 
requests rather than relieving the need of others. This idea has been around for a while in the 332 
literature in what has become known as the “sharing under pressure hypothesis”. Wrangham [74] 333 
suggested that much chimpanzee food sharing in the wild was done under intense pressure from 334 
beggars, who left as soon as they obtained a piece of meat. The idea that prosocial acts are a 335 
consequence of harassment [75, 76] can also be applied to many of the experimental settings 336 
used, i.e. when the recipient was actively reaching for the food and rattling on a chain, a low-cost 337 
way for the subjects to suppress this noise was to just release the food/token. An "opt-out" control 338 
condition in which the subjects could choose between helping and e.g. leaving the test situation 339 
could address this possibility. Children, in contrast, often provide help even when no such 340 
requests are directed at them [68, 77][JC1], thus eliminating the sharing/helping under pressure 341 
idea. 342 
One way to eliminate the sharing under pressure for those species that begged intensely is 343 
to experimentally prevent the beggar from interfering with the donor but give the opportunity to 344 
the donor to provide food. This is what has been done in numerous studies. In a now widely used 345 
test paradigm, Silk and colleagues gave chimpanzees the choice between a 1/1 and 1/0 option, i.e. 346 
they could either choose one piece of food for themselves while simultaneously providing one 347 
piece of food for a conspecific, or they could just choose one piece for themselves and nothing 348 
for the conspecific [12]. In this and most other studies, chimpanzees were shown to choose 349 
randomly between these options and therefore they were seemingly only interested in their own 350 
benefit (see [77, 78] for reviews). Horner et al. [79] have criticised the studies because the 351 
apparatus needed to implement the choices is deemed to be too complex for chimpanzees even 352 
though control conditions in several of these studies showed that chimpanzees were fully aware 353 
of the consequences of their actions on their partners’ location (e.g. [80, 81]). Instead, Horner et 354 
al. [79] advocated using a token exchange paradigm with different tokens are associated with 355 
certain outcomes to avoid this problem. However, it is not clear that tokens solve the problem 356 
because it is unclear whether chimpanzees understand how they function - Horner et al. [79] 357 
provided no evidence that chimpanzees understood the consequences of selecting certain tokens 358 
with regard to the food distribution to their partners. Recently, Amici et al. [82] tested 359 
chimpanzees and other primates with both the token exchange and the platform paradigms using 360 
protocols as similar as possible to those used in previous studies. They found no conclusive 361 
evidence of other-regarding preferences in either paradigm for any species. Interestingly, they 362 
also found that chimpanzees did not understand the value of the tokens when they were tested 363 
individually. In contrast, Claidiere et al. [83] found that chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys 364 
displayed other-regarding preferences in a version of the platform paradigm in some of their 365 
experimental conditions, but also yielded some inconsistent results that might call the subjects' 366 
full understanding of the apparatus and condition into question. 367 
In sum, collaboration and helping are well documented in experimental contexts in 368 
primates and other animals. This means that it is now possible to investigate the psychological 369 
underpinnings of cooperative acts such as coalitions and food sharing observed in wild and 370 
laboratory populations. Although there is no shortage of prosocial acts, defined as doing 371 
something that benefits another individual (e.g. two individuals working together to obtain a 372 
mutual benefit, or even an individual providing a service to another one without apparent 373 
retribution), the motivational substrate underlying those acts is still a matter of intense debate.  374 
Some authors argue that primates display other-regarding preferences while other authors explain 375 
the evidence available in terms of self-regarding preferences. A major task for the next generation 376 
of studies will be to precisely pinpoint the motivational substrate of the various prosocial acts 377 
described in the literature. 378 
Conclusions and future directions 379 
Focusing on both cooperative and competitive contexts has been important in helping 380 
comparative psychology move forward in two main ways. First, it has helped researchers to 381 
design better experiments and in doing so they have allowed researchers to uncover the cognitive 382 
abilities and motivational substrates underlying them. As a consequence, comparative psychology 383 
is now much richer both methodologically and conceptually than just a few years ago. We now 384 
know that chimpanzees and other species are sensitive to what others can and cannot see and, at 385 
least chimpanzees, can estimate this not just by direct perception but also by attributing their own 386 
perceptions and preferences to others. However, it is currently unclear whether chimpanzees also 387 
engage in level 2 perspective-taking. Cooperation has also been experimentally documented in 388 
various settings and species. Social tolerance has been confirmed as a major determinant of 389 
cooperation and work on chimpanzees seems to suggest that they prefer to work alone, but will 390 
cooperate with others for higher payoffs, and helping occurs but is mainly mediated by requests. 391 
It is currently unclear if prosocial acts in nonhuman primates are based on empathic concern or 392 
represents a form of harassment reduction or a response to novelty. Future studies will be 393 
required to address these and other outstanding issues in mindreading and cooperation research. 394 
Despite this undeniable progress, or perhaps due to it, we are faced with misaligned 395 
research agendas with regard to the psychological substrate of competition and cooperation.  396 
Although originally conceived as complementary aspects, cooperation and competition became 397 
misaligned because they did not receive the same research attention. Even the Machiavellian 398 
intelligence hypothesis which initially considered both aspects [6], became later on more 399 
associated with competition than cooperation, partly because the emphasis placed on tactical 400 
deception [84] and partly due to the success of some competitive paradigms compared to their 401 
cooperative/communicative counterparts (see Mindreading section).  Whereas cognition has been 402 
mainly investigated in competitive contexts, motivation has been the prime target of studies on 403 
cooperation and helping. It is therefore time to attempt to realign these agendas and to do so, we 404 
propose two directions. First, aspects of mindreading have to be investigated in the context of 405 
cooperation. This does not mean to repeat the same mistakes as in the past, but present 406 
cooperative tasks in which taking the perspective of others is crucial to solve them. Can the same 407 
mindreading abilities that are deployed in competition also be used to solve a cooperation task? 408 
For instance, would individuals pulling strings simultaneously take into account what their 409 
partners can and cannot see when they are trying to coordinate obtaining rewards for both 410 
partners? If they could, one should revise some ideas about the evolution of mindreading that 411 
have placed competition at its core [85]. If they could not, then perhaps perspective taking for 412 
cooperative purposes represents a fundamentally different problem, and this may lend support to 413 
the theories that have suggested that shared intentionality is crucial [61], not just the motivational 414 
aspects, but also the representational ones. 415 
Second, and equally important, is bringing into sharper focus the motivational aspects of 416 
competition. Would individuals be more likely to cooperate when such cooperation would entail 417 
competing against third parties? If Bullinger et al.'s [62] social vs. solo option study had entailed 418 
not just cooperating with a partner but also simultaneously competing against another individual, 419 
would this have shifted chimpanzees’ preference for choosing the social over the solo option? In 420 
such a case, and given that they also pick the social game when the payoff is higher than the solo 421 
game, one could even actually quantify how much individuals would be willing to pay to 422 
cooperate to compete. Would the likelihood of joining a partner depend not just on the identity of 423 
the partner but also the identity of the opponent? Placing the emphasis on each of these aspects 424 
paired with further effort along the path already travelled is likely to bring further progress and a 425 
much more balanced body of knowledge regarding the psychological mechanisms underlying 426 
cooperation and competition. The core idea here is that mindreading may not just be about 427 
competition and social motivation may not just be about cooperation in humans and other 428 
animals. 429 
We are aware that our review is biased at least in two ways. First, most of the work that 430 
we cited was done with chimpanzees.  Although there are now numerous studies that have 431 
focused on other species [29,78], it is still the case that the most sophisticated studies, which rule 432 
out some of the most resilient alternative explanations (e.g., evil-eye hypothesis) have yet to be 433 
done with those species.  Future studies are needed to broaden the taxonomic scope beyond basic 434 
abilities so that inferences about cognitive evolution stand on a much firmer ground [e.g., 49]. 435 
Second, most of the work that we cited was done in the laboratory, not in the field.  With the 436 
possible exception of playback experiments (e.g. [86]), there are virtually no field experiments on 437 
mindreading or cooperation in nonhuman primates comparable to those conducted in the 438 
laboratory (see [31, 87] for exceptions). This state of affairs is perhaps likely to change in the 439 
coming years since field experiments on social problems (e.g. social learning) have begun to 440 
appear in the primate literature with some regularity (e.g. [88-90]). Such a change may denote a 441 
change in attitude of some fieldworkers toward field experiments (others like T. Matsuzawa have 442 
always combined field and laboratory work, e.g. [90]), which may be partly mediated by the 443 
recognition that work in the laboratory and in the field must complement each other.  444 
We are also aware that the existing biases potentially compromise the scope our 445 
conclusions. Those same biases, however, also reveal the direction that we must take to overcome 446 
them.  Briefly stated, jointly focusing on the cognitive and motivational aspects of cooperation 447 
and competition paired with adopting a broader taxonomic scope applied to field and laboratory 448 
settings represent the ideal combination to further advance our knowledge about the 449 
psychological underpinnings of social life in primates and other animals. 450 
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